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AMBITIOUS PROPOSALS FOR commercial expansion and military conquest in 
the Atlantic theatres were often promoted during the War of Spanish Succession 
(1702-1713). One of the striking features of Queen Anne's War, however, was the 
British government's lack of enthusiasm for such projects. Historians have 
tended to view the war in the context of long-term imperial issues and with a 
knowledge of a developing British Empire; from this perspective they have seen 
the inconsistencies of imperial strategy in this period as a lost opportunity in the 
construction of the British Empire.1 Although the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 
secured several gains for Britain, including a favourable resolution of the disputed 
claims to Newfoundland, Hudson's Bay and Nova Scotia, the colonial objectives of 
the war were limited. British wartime strategy was directed primarily to the 
successful completion of the European struggle; overseas goals were restricted 
largely to the maintenance of a favourable status quo. British policy-makers 
were clearly not as committed to imperial expansion as it seems in retrospect 
they might have been. In large part this was because they lacked the resources 
and the mentality for such initiatives and were under no significant pressure to 
undertake aggressive expansionist projects. The central administration formulated 
trans-Atlantic wartime strategy without access to independent sources of reliable 
and relevant information. Instead the government depended heavily upon 
mercantile interest groups and individual promoters to propose and implement 
overseas imperial projects. While mercantile groups were often conservative in 
1 In particular, see George M. Waller, Samuel Vetch, Colonial Enterpriser (Chapel Hill, 1960). 
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1974), pp. 232, 236-7, 252-3, 283, J.H. Rose, A.P. Newton and E.A. Benians, eds., The 
Cambridge History of the British Empire: The Old Empire (Cambridge, 1929), pp. 325-9, 346. 
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their advice, aggressive would-be imperialists such as Michel de Bereau Monsegur, 
Thomas Ekines and Samuel Vetch advanced several projects of imperial expansion 
and conquest. These individuals belonged to a period in the evolution of British 
imperialism which could be aptly described as the age of the projectors. Their 
occasional successes and more usual failures offer insights into the conflicting 
goals and competing priorities in the formation of British imperial policy during 
the opening decade of the 18th century. 
Scholars for whom military and naval intelligence has been a passing concern 
have exaggerated the organization and competence of the British during the 
War of Spanish Succession.2 The general tendency has been to assume that 
Britain possessed a very strong intelligence system because it did achieve a few 
spectacular successes during this period. Intelligence did serve the British 
administration fairly well, most notably in the early warnings of attempted 
invasions and the capture and decoding of enemy diplomatic correspondence. 
The activities, however, were piecemeal, the personnel frequently amateurish, 
and the initiative not uncommonly lay in the hands of private individuals. To the 
extent that the British administration strongly encouraged and promoted intelligence 
gathering, it tended to focus upon main interests within the European theatre, in 
particular diplomacy and offensive enemy military activity against British armies or 
Britain itself.3 The British experienced considerable difficulty in securing timely, 
consistent, and reliable espionage from within the borders of France. Although 
diplomatic and consular representatives in Europe were under instruction to 
provide the British administration with extensive reports, as far as military 
operations overseas were concerned, embassy officials recorded next to nothing 
and what they did note was essentially rumour. 
The Crown representatives within British colonies were also under instruction 
to forward relevant intelligence to the central government and most did so, to 
the best of their abilities, at regular intervals. Colonial governments might act 
promptly on the basis of their own surveillance, but an essential difficulty with 
colonial intelligence was that — in addition to being partial and frequently of 
questionable reliability — it was late in reaching Britain. Reports of even 
2 Sir Winston S. Churchill, Marlborough: His Life and Times (London, 1933); David Chandler, 
Marlborough as Military Commander (London, 1973), pp. 133,170,188,206; Henry L. Snyder, 
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momentous events, however rapidly dispatched, took months to arrive.4 In any 
event, espionage in America was assigned a low priority in comparison with 
events within Europe. A large proportion of useful intelligence actually reached 
the administration by chance, rather than deliberate planning. Valuable naval 
information relating to the enemy was derived from commercial contacts. The 
administration learned of ship movements at Brest, Toulon or Bordeaux frequently 
through British merchants or occasionally former allied or British prisoners-of-
war; English fishing ships on the Grand Banks occasionally upon their return 
passed on news of enemy activity.5 None the less, most naval intelligence secured 
through British merchants was normally irregular and of limited value. 
Although surviving British archival information concerning espionage activity is 
fairly extensive, this is not true of naval and military intelligence for the North 
Atlantic. Throughout the war, surviving British intelligence on French naval 
activity remained extremely limited. Virtually the only news the secretaries of 
state had for the ports of Brest, La Rochelle, and St. Malo came entirely from 
public newsletters. Manuscript newsletters frequently contained better informa-
tion than printed newspapers, and the British paid considerable sums to secure 
regular access to voluminous quantities of French newsletters. It is conventional 
wisdom that military intelligence justifiably depends heavily upon careful analysis 
of readily accessible public information. Nevertheless, the quantity and quality 
of useful material for overseas policy were both weak. Administrators deemed 
even trivial information to be worthy of serious interest. The undersecretaries of 
state regularly extracted comments from the newsletters and despatched them to 
the Admiralty. In general the office of the secretary of state kept in close com-
munication with the Admiralty. But again, the relevant material for the Atlantic 
theatre was meagre. The agencies did what they could, but without a stroke of 
good fortune information was either non-existent or of poor quality.6 
4 For average times and communications in general see Ian K. Steele, The English Atlantic 
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September 1708); The London Gazette, nos. 4459, 4476. 
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Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland, IV (London, 1899), pp. 96-7; Ragnhild Hatton, 
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tration, 1689-1714", Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, XVII (1939), pp. 20-6. 
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Into this information gap flowed the special interest groups and the projectors 
of early 18th century Britain. These were the very individuals likely to have some 
knowledge of the topics they specially favoured, but their information was 
tailored to suit their own ambitions and needs. In commerce and in military 
affairs the early 18th century has been referred to as the age of the projector.7 Yet 
there has been no study to the present of the extent to which the central government 
utilized and was dependent upon projectors and interested parties in the development 
of overseas policies during the war. These hopeful adventurers were intent upon 
personal ambition but boldly sounded the rhetoric of public advantage. Samuel 
Vetch asserted that his 1707-9 project for the conquest of French Canada could 
be "putt in the Balance with the greatest Enterprises, that have bein projected 
since the revolution [of 1688] both with regard to the honour, and Intrest of the 
Brittish Empyre, both att home and abroad", and identified himself as an "Intirely 
devoted servant to the Crowne and Interest of Great Brittain". He neglected to 
mention his recent conviction for illegal wartime trade with the French at Port 
Royal, and did not initially make explicit that the quid pro quo for his knowledge 
and assistance was the colonial governorship of all conquered territories. John 
Graves, in urging the necessity of a strong British military presence in the 
devastated Bahama Islands during 1709 emphasized his own expertise and his 
willingness "to serve the Crowne and My Nation at those Islands in what Post hir 
Majty shall think fit", although he strongly hinted that he too desired the governor's 
office. Others, more modest or lacking in specific proposals, simply outlined 
their past experience in the Americas and left their employment to what they 
hoped was a suitably impressed administration.8 
The middle years of the war — the period from late 1706 until late 1710 — 
possess considerable significance for British wartime military policy. Until the 
autumn of 1707 British strategy reflected Marlborough's own priority of direct 
pressure upon France's frontiers. In the campaigns of 1702-1707 the colonies 
were left almost entirely to their own devices. Not only were assertive overseas 
expeditions considered useless diversions of manpower and finance from the 
main struggle in Europe, but inadequate attention was paid to defence. The 
resources of the British navy were concentrated upon the European theatre with 
serious consequences for the defence of the seaboard colonies, the Newfound-
7 Joan Thirsk, Economic Policy and Projects (Oxford, 1978); Peter Jones, "Antoine De 
Guiscard, 'Abbé De La Bourlie', 'Marquis De Guiscard'", The British Library Journal, VIII 
(1982), pp. 94-113. 
8 Vetch to Robert Hunter, Boston, 20 November 1709, B.L., Add. Ms. 61647, fo. 22; Vetch, 
"Canada Survey'd", B.L., Add. Ms. 61647, fo. 10. For Vetch see Waller, Samuel Vetch and J.D. 
Alsop, "Samuel Vetch's 'Canada Survey'd': The Formation of a Colonial Strategy, 1706-1710", 
Acadiensis, XII, 1 (Autumn 1982), pp. 39-58. For Graves see B.L., Add. Ms. 61623, fos 14-17. 
For another illustration see J.D. Alsop, "A Darien Epilogue: Robert Allen in Spanish America, 
1698-1707", The Americas, XLIII (1986), pp. 197-201. 
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land fishery and merchant shipping. The diversion of naval resources from the 
Atlantic region to the Mediterranean was particularly noticeable in 1707 for the 
full-scale sea-borne attack on Toulon. The failure of this expedition, accompan-
ied as it was by heavy losses of British shipping, the collapse of an early war 
boom in Spanish American trade and general dissatisfaction with the progress 
of the war, produced sustained criticism of the government in the autumn 1707 
Parliament. The ministry supported a convoy act for trade protection and 
agreed to devote greater resources for the conquest of Spain and its colonies for 
the Austrian claimant.9 In subsequent years interest in overseas aspects of the 
conflict broadened. The virtual stalemate on the European battlefields encou-
raged the political search for alternative locations where rapid and relatively 
effortless military advantages could be secured. Meanwhile existing mercantile 
interest groups brought their concerns before both Parliament and the ministry. 
It was in this context that the British government came to support the projected 
1709 expedition against Canada, the 1710 attack on Port Royal, the 1711 effort 
at Quebec, the 1709-10 rescue of St. John's, Newfoundland, as well as the 1709 
resettlement of the Bahamas.10 Since all these colonial initiatives of the later 
stages of the War of Spanish Succession originated with projectors, it is useful to 
examine the characteristics which distinguished the successful projector from 
the unsuccessful. 
More than vague assurances of great gains were necessary to advance a 
proposal beyond the petitionary stage. Along with a coherent project, topical 
and relevant to ministry interests, what was essential was the support of existing 
vested interests, particularly commercial concerns. Projectors and special interest 
groups went hand-in-hand. The projector on his own was engaged in an unlikely 
pursuit of ministerial attention and funding against equally persuasive schemes 
in the minds of competitors and the wariness — even inertia — of the government. 
Without a stroke of exceptionally good fortune the unassisted projector was 
unlikely to succeed. Successful projectors had to link their proposals to the 
existing concerns of particular influential interests in order to win, and retain, 
ministry approval. 
9 Ian K. Steele, Politics of Colonial Policy: The Board of Trade in Colonial Administration, 
1696-1720 (Oxford, 1968), pp. xiv, 93, 100-6; Churchill, Marlborough, III, pp. 277-87; Patrick 
Crowhurst, The Defence of British Trade, 1689-1815 (Folkestone, 1977); Chandler, Marlbo-
rough, pp. 200-3; William L. Sachse, Lord Somers (Manchester, 1975), pp. 255-7; Steele, 
English Atlantic, pp. 177-80; D.W. Jones, War and Economy in the Age of William III and 
Marlborough (Oxford, 1988), pp. 156, 161-4; Votes of the House of Commons in the First 
Parliament of Great Britain, Appointed to Meet at Westminster the Three and Twentieth Day of 
October in the Sixth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, An. Dom. 1707 (London, 1707). 
10 Crowhurst, British Trade, pp. 112-20; Alsop, "Vetch's 'Canada Survey'd'", pp. 39-58; W.T. 
Morgan, "Some Attempts at Imperial Co-operation During the Reign of Queen Anne", 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th ser, X (1927), p. 177 and passim. 
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Michel de Bereau Monsegur provides a relevant illustration of the unsuccess-
ful imperial projector. A minor military adventurer from Bayonne, Monsegur 
entered the British military scene as a protégé of the controversial Marquis de 
Guiscard, who came to London in February 1706 to pursue his plan for an allied 
seaborne invasion of France." The initiative eventually foundered when the 
expeditionary force was diverted to Spain, but Guiscard was at the peak of his 
influence, patronized by prominent members of the government and an acknowledged 
leader of a faction among the Huguenot immigrants. The attraction of French 
exiles into his orbit and the creation of Huguenot regiments for the invasion 
provided employment for a number of refugees, among whom were Monsegur 
and also Jean-Paul Mascarene, a young Huguenot from Languedoc who had 
been raised in Geneva and arrived in England by early 1706.12 
The patronage provided by Guiscard (Monsegur characterized it as "fatherly" 
support and assistance13) proved useful in the aftermath of the aborted French 
venture, when Monsegur turned his attention to a military enterprise of his own. 
According to statements Monsegur made in 1710, during the English raids in the 
mid-1690s, Jacques-François de Mombeton de Brouillan had placed the disposition 
of the defence of Placentia (or Plaisance) almost entirely in his hands. Since the 
garrison is known to have been under the command of other officers, there was 
presumably some exaggeration in this claim. However, there is no reason to 
doubt his employment at Placentia and he may well have held a favoured 
position under the governor Brouillan, a member of a Protestant noble family in 
Gascony who converted to Catholicism soon after his arrival in New France in 
1687.14 Clearly, inside knowledge of the fortress was a valuable asset and Monsegur 
hoped to convince imperial administrators that he could arrange a certain and 
easy surprise of Placentia and the removal of French influence in Newfound-
land. 
Monsegur's previous experience determined the objective for his project, but 
he also had some reason to expect that the capture of Placentia would prove 
11 Jones, "Guiscard", pp. 93-113. 
12 Mascarene (1685-1760) came to North America for the aborted 1709 expedition against 
Canada, took part in the 1710 capture of Port Royal, and eventually rose to the rank of major 
general and to the post of lieutenant governor of Annapolis Royal:Dictionary of Canadian 
Biography, Volume ///(Toronto, 1974), pp. 435-9; J.B. Brebner, "Paul Mascarene of Annapolis 
Royal", in G.A. Rawlyk, ed., Historical Essays on the Atlantic Provinces (Toronto, 1967), pp. 
17-32; J. D. Alsop, "The Distribution of British Officers in the Colonial Militia for the Canadian 
Expedition of 1709", Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, LXV (1987), pp. 
120-1. 
13 B.L., Add. Ms. 61648, fo. 1; William A. Shaw, ed., Calendar of Treasury Books, 1660-1718 
(London, 1904-57), XXVIII (1714), pp. 460, 462. 
14 C.S.P., XXV, no. 506; Dictionary of Canadian Biography, Vol. II (Toronto, 1969), pp. 
478-81. 
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appealing to the ministry. The British claimed all Newfoundland by right of 
discovery and settlement, and in their view the French were dangerous interlopers 
threatening British sovereignty as well as commercial and strategic interests. The 
French attack on English settlements in the winter of 1704-5 aggravated fears 
and led the commander of the St. John's garrison, Major Thomas Lloyd, to 
press repeatedly from the summer of 1705 onwards for an attempt against 
Placentia. Although he was supported in London by the merchant Soloman 
Merrett, these efforts had no immediate success; indeed, they frequently took 
second place to the necessity of justifying Lloyd's conduct of affairs at the St. 
John's base in the face of repeated hostile accusations.15 Although Major Lloyd 
was well informed on the state of Placentia, including recent accounts of new 
fortifications derived from spies, without influential assistance at Whitehall his 
efforts to interest the central administration in even a modest expedition stood 
little chance of success. 
In the autumn of 1706, relying upon the favouritism of Guiscard, Monsegur 
first approached the commissioners of the Navy with his project, who sent a 
favourable recommendation to Secretary of State Sir Charles Hedges. When 
Hedges was replaced by Charles Spencer, Earl of Sunderland, in December 1706 
Monsegur dispatched the first of a lengthy series of communications to Sunderland 
and undersecretary of state Joseph Addison. The initial arguments advanced by 
Monsegur focused upon the significance of Newfoundland for French interests 
in Acadia, Quebec and Hudson's Bay, and the harm which Placentia did to the 
Grand Banks fishery and to all Britain's American colonies as a base for naval 
operations. This was far from empty rhetoric since other sources besides Monsegur 
and Major Lloyd were presenting similar advice. Sunderland considered the 
Huguenot worthy of some encouragement and on 17 October 1707 recommended 
that the destitute Monsegur be awarded a pension, although it was not until 
June of 1708 that an annual allowance of £91.5.0 was awarded.16 As time slipped 
by without action, Monsegur decided to widen the appeal of his project. His 
December 1707 memorial placed the capture of Placentia in a European context 
by emphasizing the economic dislocation which would occur in France's maritime 
provinces where employment was linked to the Grand Banks fishery. But Monsegur 
was grasping at straws. His connections lay within the Huguenot community, 
not the Newfoundland fisheries lobby, and by 1707-8 the influence within the 
British administration of his patron Guiscard had tumbled.17 
15 Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations from April 1704, to February 1708-9 
(London, 1920), pp. 311-12, 419, 442; C.S.P., XXII, no. 315, XXIII, nos. 419, 446, 1109. 
16 CS.P., XXV, no. 506; B.L., Add. Mss. 61648, fos. 1-12, 28-9, 61652, fo. 34; Shaw, Treasury 
Books, XXII (1708), p. 275. 
17 B.L., Add. Ms. 61648, fo. 14; Jones, "Guiscard", pp. 105-7. 
The Age of the Projectors 37 
After the approval in late 1708 of an attack upon French Canada, Monsegur 
managed to have himself attached, as an aide-de-camp, to the expeditionary 
force assembled at Portsmouth under the command of Brigadier Thomas Whetham. 
Perhaps this was a precautionary move by Whitehall; the supplementary instructions 
of 9 May 1709 for Whetham ordered that, if due to his late arrival at Boston or 
the insufficiency of the colonial forces an attempt against Quebec was impractical, 
then he was to seize Placentia and remove the French from Newfoundland. In 
the event, the entire expedition was diverted to Spain in July and Monsegur was 
ordered to remain in Britain.18 Although Monsegur once again pushed his 
favourite scheme during the 1710 preparations against Port Royal and the 1711 
expedition to Quebec, the inattention of the ministry was obvious. Indeed, his 
allowance remained unpaid from the end of 1710 until 1713; finally in 1715 the 
new regime fixed his pension at a mere £15 per annum and these annual payments 
constitute the only known evidence of a would-be imperialist over the subsequent 
years.19 
Monsegur had offered the government a timely and knowledgeable proposition, 
and pursued his quest diligently for at least five years. He failed because he was a 
military adventurer lacking close contacts with, or the support of, the English 
Grand Banks fishing interest, and because Newfoundland, in itself, did not 
constitute a high strategic priority within the administration. No matter how 
broadly Monsegur attempted to sell his project, an attack against Placentia had 
limited appeal and at best would merely be added onto a more significant 
campaign against New France. 
Probably the most assiduous imperial projector of the War of Spanish Succession 
was Thomas Ekines, whose experience provides another case study in the failure 
of imperialist schemes. Ekines'endeavours began at least as early as the Glorious 
Revolution. On 16 January 1689 he convinced William III, as Prince of Orange, 
to assign him temporary command of a Dutch man-of-war in an effort to capture 
the French St. John of Rochelle lying off the Isles of Scilly and reputedly worth 
£20,000. According to Ekines he seized the ship but it was later released on 
appeal, leaving him with unpaid debts and no reward.20 In December 1689 he 
acquired command of a small 20-gun frigate utilized as a Post Office packet boat 
between Falmouth and Corunna in Spain during the hostilities with France, but 
lost the post when disabled by sickness. He later served as a volunteer in the 
Royal Navy without pay and in 1705 took part in the Earl of Peterborough's 
expedition into the Mediterranean. Apparently he proposed to take five British 
18 C.S.P., XXIV, no. 297; B.L., Add. Ms. 61648, fos. 17-27; Shaw, Treasury Books, XXIII (1709), 
pp. 215, 422; Robert Pringle to Monsegur, Whitehall, 2 July 1709, B.L., Add. Ms. 61653, fo. 168. 
19 C.S.P., XXV, no. 506; Shaw, Treasury Books, XXVIII (1714), p. 288, XXIX (1714-15), pp. 365, 
681. 
20 Officers of the Prize Office to the Lords of the Treasury, Westminister, 20 January 1694, B.L., 
Add. Ms. 61644, fos. 45-6. 
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ships and 1,000 soldiers from the main force across the Atlantic to seize and sack 
Buenos Aires. He served with the expedition at sea for nine months without pay 
and even brought along at his own expense knowledgeable pilots, but Peterborough's 
capture of Barcelona negated his project. As pressure began to mount by 1707 
for a more assertive British overseas policy, Ekines once again found an opportunity. 
When in July 1707 the Board of Trade and Plantations was considering the topic 
of an attack upon the pirates at Martinique and Guadeloupe, Ekines offered to 
command a fourth-rate man-of-war in the expedition; he was informed that the 
Board did not make recommendations for the employment of specific individuals.21 
By the following year Ekines had raised his expectations considerably. On 17 
June 1708 he dispatched to the ministry an elaborate proposal for a substantial 
naval campaign in Spanish America. The projector was very specific about the 
size of the expedition he desired to command: 1,500 men and six fourth-rate 
men-of-war. He knew how the ships could be acquired without inconvenience: 
six of the best merchant ships would be requisitioned, supplied with ordnance 
from the Tower of London and exchanged for Navy men-of-war currently 
guarding the coal colliers on Britain's east coast. He had also calculated the cost 
of the expeditionary force, with provisions for 18 months, down to the last 
shilling: £28,647.10.0, including £730 for his own salary. Ekines had researched 
his theme extensively, providing fulsome information on all the silver produc-
tion in South and Central America and the routes used to transport it, including 
as well the Phillipines to Acapulco shipments. Where he was extremely vague 
was in regard to the destination of the force. He stated only that he would go to 
every colonial port apart from Lima and Panama, destroy their navigation, take 
or ruin the French traders, destroy all fortifications, compel the inhabitants to 
pledge allegiance to King Charles (the British candidate contesting the Spanish 
throne with the Bourbon Philip V) and if possible seize a Spanish silver fleet.22 
Ekines was very obviously attempting to capitalize upon the government's 
stated intention to devote greater attention to the conquest of Spain and its 
colonies for the Austrian claimant. British concern that the French were coming 
to dominate Spanish American commerce to the severe impediment of British 
interests was at a peak by 1708,23 and Ekines skilfully played upon this fear with 
extensive commentary and evidence in his proposal. By the summer of 1708 the 
central administration, led by Lord Treasurer Godolphin, was seriously considering 
21 Ibid., fos. 44-6; P.R.O., SP 35/77, fo. 228; C.S.P., XXIII, no. 1025; Journal of Trade and 
Plantations, 1704-1709, p. 398. 
22 Ekines to Lords [of the ministry? retained by Secretary of State Sunderland], 17 June 1708, 
B.L., Add. Ms. 61644, fos. 34-7. 
23 Joseph Addison, The Present State of the War, and the Necessity of an Augmentation, Considered 
(1707), in Richard Hurd, ed., The Works of the Right Honourable Joseph Addison (London, 
1856), IV, pp. 340-6 and passim. Also, Governor Handasyde to Sunderland, Jamaica, 20 July 
1708, B.L., Add. Ms. 61643. 
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an overseas initiative and Spanish America was one of the favoured targets.24 
With historical hindsight it would be easy to dismiss Ekines as a hopeless 
adventurer whom no one in authority took seriously. Yet Ekines attracted 
considerable ministry interest with his June 1708 scheme. He entered into 
discussions with both Godolphin and Sunderland and all discerned a reasonable 
prospect for an immediate 1708 expedition. A central difficulty, of which Ekines 
was well aware, was that of resources. The national government in its consideration 
of overseas activity always desired the maximum military, political and economic 
advantage with the minimum commitment of manpower, ships and money. 
Although the conscription of merchant shipping would be politically trouble-
some, West Indian commercial interests were at this very time protesting to the 
administration about the limited British presence in the region.25 The solution 
was to turn the endeavour into one administered and financed by a mercantile 
consortium. This was a serious proposition before the end of June 1708, but one 
to which Ekines expressed complete opposition even though the development 
was a logical extension of existing war strategy. Britain was committed to 
supporting the Austrian Hapsburg claim to both Spain and its colonial empire, 
and expected preferential peacetime trading arrangements in return.26 The 
potential for territorial expansion in Spanish America was therefore negligible. 
As the Duke of Marlborough disparagingly remarked in 1709 when suggestions 
for a West Indian expedition surfaced once again, such campaigns always served 
as "a pretext to plunder". Since Britain would not undertake an obligation to 
maintain a strong presence in any captured territories for the duration of the 
war, short-term disruption and plunder was all that could be expected. Even 
Marlborough, opposed to any diversion from the main struggle against France, 
acknowledged the ready appeal of such a pecuniary endeavour for English 
commercial interests and some politicians.27 
As for Ekines, he could see the control of the expedition slipping from his 
grasp. While protesting against mercantile direction, he requested a letter from 
the government to the involved (unspecified) merchants appointing him as 
commander so that he could negotiate terms with them.28 Events unfolded 
slowly, far too slowly for Ekines, and time elapsed without results. The news at 
24 Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin, pp. 1093-5; Alsop, "Vetch's 'Canada Survey'd'"; Churchill, 
Marlborough, III, pp. 277-87. For other projected 1708 military initiatives in Spanish America: 
B.L., Add. Mss. 61596, fo. 130, 61644, fos. 54-9. 
25 Crowhurst, British Trade, pp. 179-80. 
26 Curtis Nettels,"England and the Spanish American Trade, 1680-1715", Journal of Modern 
History, III (1931), pp. 1-32; Geoffrey J. Walker, Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, 1700-1789 
(London, 1979), pp. 19-92. 
27 Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin, pp. 1355, 1485. 
28 B.L., Add. Ms. 61644, fos. 42-3. 
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the beginning of September, that Ducasse had brought the Spanish treasure fleet 
to the Bay of Biscay but left behind a number of galleons at Carthagena, brought 
a focus to his activities. He immediately sent Godolphin a proposal to renew the 
expedition. This time he desired the command of seven or eight men-of-war and 
2,600 soldiers for a three-phased project: first he would take Carthagena and the 
galleons; then the expedition would fall upon Vera Cruse and destroy the flotilla 
reported to be there; and finally the force would make use of the prevailing 
currents to run north to Placentia, where they would arrive in February or early 
March before the return of French ships and fishermen for an easy conquest and 
a triumphant return home in May. Godolphin was favourably disposed, and in a 
letter to Marlborough of 3 September he noted both the "great ferment here" in 
support of the initiative and his own intention to take 2,500 men from the regiments 
currently with the fleet intended for Portugal, to be replaced by others presently 
in Ireland and Scotland.29 He did, however, conclude with a mixed final comment 
"I own, I think, the thing is right, but wee want proper persons for the execution 
of almost anything". The implied criticism of Ekines, not mentioned by name by 
Godolphin, was of less consequence than Marlborough's own influence within 
the ministry. As Godolphin related on 6 September, no matter "how pressing in 
their several respects" the expedition would be, the fortuitous arrival of a letter 
from Marlborough had led the Queen to divert the regiments intended for 
Portugal directly to the Spanish Netherlands for Marlborough's service. "And 
as for getting the regiments we want every moment to send to the West Indies, 
there remains no expedient but to take them from Ireland. But I must own I 
expect difficultyes in that matter from my Lord Lieutenant [of Ireland]".30 
Although Godolphin dispatched Ekines to Sunderland on 8 September for 
further consultation, Ekines' best opportunity for imperial fame and personal 
advancement had passed. 
In evaluating the 1708 initiatives, it is fairly certain that Ekines' character and 
record was a handicap. In itself this was not an insurmountable difficulty. The 
adventurer's ability to develop topical and well-documented proposals was a 
worthwhile asset for a government largely lacking information and slow to 
engage in imperial planning. Lord Treasurer Godolphin took Ekines seriously. 
The first effort collapsed apparently because Ekines failed to acquire the support 
of the relevant commercial interests and indeed was actively opposed to their 
involvement in the enterprise. Had it not been for this lack of cohesion between 
projector and merchants it is likely that a Spanish American campaign, with 
limited state assistance, would have been mounted during 1708. The later 
September scheme collapsed because of tensions within the ministry. Historians, 
29 Ekines to Sunderland, 8 September 1708, B.L., Add. Ms. 61644, fos. 44-v; Snyder, Marlborough-
Godolphin, pp. 1093-4. 
30 Snyder, Marlborough-Godolphin, pp. 1089, 1095. 
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especially those writing from a North American perspective, frequently assign 
the imperial failures of the War of Spanish Succession to a Eurocentric governmental 
policy where European concerns always took priority over colonial interests. 
This case demonstrates a greater complexity. Godolphin, as head of the ministry, 
was eager to divert troops intended for Portugal to the Caribbean. It was a 
coincidence that Marlborough, writing before news of the Carthagena galleons 
had been received and concerned with his own military strength, successfully 
asserted his influence to alter the destination of the force from Portugal to 
Ostend. The struggle for scarce military resources took place within the European 
theatres and not simply between Europe and the colonies. The West Indies, in 
this instance, took precedence over Portugal; with a slightly modified combination 
of events the decision might have been very different. 
Ekines was not deterred by the events of 1708. He soon turned his attentions 
to Newfoundland, as did others in a period of increasing concern about the 
security of the island and the state of the fishery following the successful French 
assault on St. John's in December 1708. In early 1709 Ekines attempted to 
influence developing British policy.31 The obvious move would have been to 
re-establish a military force at St. John's and retaliate against Placentia. Ekines 
argued directly against this course. Since the capture of Placentia had been on 
his agenda in September 1708, the conclusion must be that Ekines was once 
again shaping his plans to combine topicality with personal advantage. Since 
others, Monsegur included, knew far more about Placentia than did Ekines, he 
tailored his proposal around what he knew best: naval affairs and, by extension, 
the fishery: 
The ffrench have Encouraged it [the fishing trade] mightily, for it was the 
sole Rise, and still is the Chiefe support of their Maratin power...for in 
peace they carry vast Numbers of the kings Soldiers to make them seamen... 
so that by this ffishery they Imploy 25 thousand seamen which is the better 
part of all the Seamen of ffrance .... it being probable her Ma ie may soon 
retake St. John's, and if we could take Placentia also yet that would not 
hinder much of their fishery, for it could no way prevent any from ffishing 
on the Bank which is 30 or 40 Leagues off shore, and Newfound Land 
being an Island as big as the Kingdome of England and but a Thousand 
English men on it and they ffishermen that only mind getting a livelyhood 
Tis unlikely wee should prevent the ffrench from running into any uninhabited 
Port with their Armed ships and ffish and do what they please Tho we had 
Placentia. 
31 B.L., Add. Ms. 61647, fos. 207-v. The report is undated, but since Ekines knew of the French 
taking of St. John's but not of any British response it must date from 1709, probably soon after 
the news reached England. 
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The truth of Ekines' argument that Placentia was not essential to the French 
Grand Banks fishery,32 does not disguise the special pleading involved in his own 
preferred remedy: 
But the most Effectuall and Easy way to ruine that Trade to the ffrench is 
by appointing a Governour for the Island with as good provision of sallary 
as any of the Sugar Islands have, and lett him provide 600 Seamen and as 
many Soldiers Regimentall as the Mariens... and shall not only defend the 
fforts and other places of the Island But shall Man 4 good ships with 
upwards of 200 Men in each which may be the largest Gallyes hired as 
Transports and by lying there in Port may sudenly or att all times run Out 
and fall on the ffrench Bankers, Or Range along shore and take all advantages 
of burneing and destroying all ships and ffishing Boates, stages, and 
houses.... by this they will be continually suffering till they are ruiened by 
Clean ships just running Out upon them, which will be more advantageous 
then ten times the money and fforces Imployed any other way.... 
When the government made its plans for Newfoundland in 1709-10 Ekines' 
scheme was entirely ignored. To be acceptable, an imperial initiative had to be in 
harmony with current ministerial attitudes, and every event demonstrates that 
the ministry was intent upon exactly what Ekines argued against: a limited 
re-occupation of St. John's with a reprisal raid on Placentia and no desire for a 
permanent extension of military or naval forces on the island. Then too, Ekines 
apparently made no effort to involve the existing fishery interests in his project. 
Indeed, the West Country fishing lobby would hardly have been pleased with a 
proposal for a British governor in Newfoundland. Ekines was simply casting 
around for any feasible employment. Later in 1709, with the arrival in England 
of large numbers of German refugees from the Palatinate, he devoted more than 
eight months to a scheme to settle 150 Palatine families on the Isles of Scilly. 
Although he received the personal approval of Queen Anne for the plan and a 
royal commission (which he later claimed amounted to the joint-governorship of 
the isles), Ekines was still petitioning in the 1720s for a financial recompense for 
the service.33 In his later years Ekines continued along the path which he had 
alredy trod with so little effect. He was engaged in a series of law suits, and in 
1723 he promoted a scheme to settle Tobago in order to protect Barbados from 
the French and increase sugar production; his predictable reward was to be the 
post of lieutenant-governor of the colony. The next year Ekines attempted to 
32 C. Grant Head, Eighteenth Century Newfoundland (Toronto, 1976); JeanFrançois Briére, 
"Pêche et politique à Terre-Neuve au XVIIIe siècle: la France véritable gagnante du traité 
d'Utrecht?", Canadian Historical Review, LXIV (1983), pp. 168-87. 
33 B.L., Add. Mss. 61649, fos.92-3v, 61652, fo. 184; P.R.O., SP 35/77, fo. 228. 
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interest the government in the colonization of another Caribbean island.34 
Monsegur and Ekines represented the unsuccessful imperial entrepreneur. 
One of the very few projectors in colonial affairs to achieve unqualified acceptance 
of his proposals by the ministry was Samuel Vetch. His career has been subjected 
to detailed study, and at this point it is necessary only to sketch briefly his 
imperial policy and to explain his success with the national government.35 A 
former soldier and survivor of the Scottish Darien colony on the Isthmus of 
Panama, Vetch had settled first in New York (where he married the daughter of 
the merchant and frontier developer Robert Livingstone) and later at Boston. 
From both New York and Boston he was active in the trade with New France, 
and by 1707 had visited the French territories on five occasions, claiming to be 
the best informed Briton on that subject.36 An ambitious man, Vetch was on 
amicable terms with many of the colonial elite. His first known imperial scheme 
was submitted in February 1706 to the influential Earl of Halifax and Lord 
Somers. Vetch proposed three possible initiatives: the capture of Quebec and the 
establishment of a Scottish colony on the St. Lawrence; the re-assertion of the 
English claim to Nova Scotia as a protection for the northern colonies and a base 
for naval supplies; and the creation of a new colony north of Massachusetts 
between the Kennebec and St. George's rivers to serve as a barrier against the 
French and as a source of naval stores and fish.37 Evidently Vetch at this date 
sought personal advancement through colonial expansion, but was willing to 
undertake any project within his field of expertise in northern mainland America. 
Writing from Boston, he was unaware which, if any, of his ideas would interest 
the central government. Although he astutely stressed the advantages to Britain 
and the empire, his goals were vague and he lacked influential connections 
within the administration. The predictable result, as with many such proposals, 
was that the plans were ignored and appear never to have left the possession of 
the Earl of Halifax. 
Yet within two and a half years the adventurer was to enjoy unprecedented 
ministerial success with his proposal to remove the French from North America. 
His detailed and knowledgeable tract of 1707-8 entitled "Canada Survey'd", 
with its plan for a combined overland and seaborne conquest of New France, 
34 B.L., Add. Mss. 61119, fos. 19-23v, 61649, fo. 3, Stowe Ms. 246, fos. 73-4, Sloane Mss. 4046, fos. 
354-7,4047, fos. 169-70. Since in 1723 and 1724 Ekines attempted to use Sir Hans Sloane as an 
intermediary with the government, and the projects remain amongst Sloane's papers, it is 
apparent that Sloane did not transmit the obviously farfetched proposals. 
35 For his career see Waller, Vetch; G.M. Waller, "Samuel Vetch", in Dictionary of Canadian 
Biography, Volume II, pp. 650-2; The Dictionary of American Biography (New York, 1936), 
XIX, pp. 260-1; The Dictionary of National Biography (London, 1885-1901), LVIII, pp. 293-6. 
For the development of his colonial proposal see Alsop, "Vetch's 'Canada Survey'd'". 
36 Vetch to Sunderland, London, 15 June 1708, B.L., Add. Ms. 61647, fos. 1-2. 
37 B.L., Egerton Ms. 929, fos. 90-4. 
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secured government acceptance and led directly to the successive campaigns of 
1709, 1710 and 1711. Together, these constituted the most notable imperial 
initiative of the war. How had Vetch, by 1707 a discredited former merchant 
convicted of illegal wartime commerce with the enemy, managed to influence the 
formation of public strategy? In the first place, the climate of opinion within the 
administration by later 1708 was conducive to overseas activity which would not 
tax resources and which promised substantial military gains.38 Secondly, 
knowledge ability, perseverance and contacts all featured in Vetch's endeavour. 
Undoubtedly he was a persuasive individual with valuable information on New 
France. Having travelled to London in 1707 for a successful appeal against his 
trading conviction, Vetch could argue his proposal in person. However he was 
hardly a charismatic figure who secured ready acceptance for his ambitious 
scheme. When "Canada Survey'd" was first presented to Secretary of State 
Sunderland on 15 June 1708 the only response was indifference, and indecision 
followed Vetch's subsequent presentation of an extensively revised tract to the 
commissioners for Trade and Plantations on 27 July. Vetch demonstrated 
single-minded perseverance from his first approach in June 1708 until the 
eventual agreement of the ministry six months later and the formal grant of his 
commission at the end of February 1709. Given the complexity and competing 
priorities of the British administrative system continual prompting was 
necessary. After Vetch's departure for North America in March 1709 to organize 
the colonial resources for the projected expedition he continued to stress, and 
even exaggerate, the attractions of his policy. After his departure the central 
government demonstrated little durable support for the agreed aims in the face 
of competing pressures.39 Even after the 1709 initiative had to be abandoned due 
to the diversion of the British regiments and naval support to Spain and the 
exhaustion of colonial forces, Vetch renewed efforts for a limited 1710 campaign 
directed against Port Royal.40 With the success of this endeavour and Vetch's 
installation as the British governor, he served as commander of the colonial 
forces in the ill-fated 1711 Walker expedition against Quebec. 
Vetch's real ability as a projector negotiating with the British administration 
lay in the skilful manipulation of his proposals to harmonize with current 
concerns of the government and existing interested parties. He imaginatively 
interwove British sensitivity about Newfoundland, the Spanish American trade, 
the Carolinas-Florida border and the ruin of the Bahamas into his scheme. More 
important, he had the support of interested parties. In 1708 he benefitted from 
the support of leading figures within both New York and Massachussetts Bay, 
38 Alsop, "Vetch's 'Canada Survey'd'", pp. 45-9 and passim. 
39 Ibid., pp. 52-6; B.L., Add. 61647, fos. 1-35. 
40 Waller, passim; Bruce T. McCully, "Catastrophe in the Wilderness: New Light on the Canadian 
Expedition of 1709", William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd. ser., XI (1954), pp. 441-56; B.L., Add. 
Ms. 61647, fos. 20-5, 181. 
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including the latter's Governor Joseph Dudley. And, as "Canada Survey'd" 
reveals, Vetch was in contact with London merchants involved with the northern 
colonies.41 His ability to draw Francis Nicholson (the previous lieutenant-
governor of the Dominion of New England and Virginia, and former governor 
of Maryland and Virginia) into his plan as the unofficial second-in-command 
was likely crucial in acquiring the support of the commissioners for Trade and 
Plantations in November 1708. Later during the winter of 1709-10 Vetch was 
pushing the necessity of an attack upon Port Royal under the handicap of 
writing from New England, but Nicholson was dispatched to London to argue 
the case and those actively in favour included Governor Dudley, the commercial 
elite of Boston (who petitioned the Queen directly), and the Salem fishing 
interest.42 
In explaining the acceptance of Vetch's proposal as official policy, stress has 
traditionally been laid upon the breadth and visionary quality of "Canada 
Survey'd", a reversal of military policy at Whitehall, and the acquisition of 
inside political patronage in the form of "a certain gentleman" who, in effect, 
secured ministry approval.43 Such an argument constitutes a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the creation of imperial strategy in this period. The British 
authorities were less interested in the visionary aspect of the scheme than in its 
effectiveness for current wartime goals. There is no evidence that his plan depended 
upon or instilled a new imperial consciousness in the government. Similarly, the 
search for a single administration supporter of the plan has proved to be futile.44 
The ministry in general demonstrated little concern for overseas initiatives in the 
absence of repeated prompting from projectors and vested interests, while the 
commissioners for Trade and Plantations rarely committed themselves to 
military policy recommendations in these years.45 The projector was very much 
on his own. As Vetch's case reveals, his success depended upon an ability to 
determine appropriate goals, to work in harmony with the existing forces, 
including the colonial governors and commercial interests, and to pursue his 
personal ambition relentlessly. 
41 Alsop, "Vetch's 'Canada Survey'd"', pp. 50-2; B.L., Add. Ms. 61647, fo. 7. For Vetch's support 
from New Hampshire and elsewhere see Haffenden, New England in the English Nation, pp. 
249-50. 
42 S.S. Webb, "The Strange Career of Francis Nicholson", William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 
XXIII (1966), pp. 513-48; Bruce T. McCully, "Governor Francis Nicholson, Patron Par Excellence 
of Religion and Learning in Colonial America", ibid., 3rd ser., XXXIX (1982), pp. 310-33, and 
works cited there. George A. Rawlyk, Nova Scotia's Massachusetts (Montreal, 1973), pp. 110, 
116; B.L., Add. Ms. 61647, fos. 26-7. 
43 Waller, Vetch, pp. 114-6, 169-70, "Vetch", p. 651; Haffenden p. 250. 
44 Alsop, "Vetch's 'Canada Survey'd'", pp. 40-4, 54-5. 
45 Steele, Colonial Policy, pp. 104, 116, 132. 
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Vetch was by no means unique, although his project has acquired the highest 
historical profile. Richard Jennings, a projector who had earlier been involved 
in proposals to seize the Havana silver fleet and to remove French privateers 
from Martinique, and John Graves, the displaced colonist and customs collector 
of the Bahamas, worked together to interest the government in the resettlement 
of New Providence, Bahamas. Commercial groups as far flung as London, 
Jamaica, Carolina, New York and Bermuda were reported in support of the 
endeavour. The disruption created by French and Spanish infiltration of the 
Bahamas led to petitioning of the Crown, which activity produced the 1709 effort to 
reassert British influence in the area.46 The relief of St John's, Newfoundland, in 
1709-10 provides another illustration of the role of mercantile interests in 
provoking government action, in this instance partly led by James Campbell of 
London. The administration ignored the projectors in the end and placed the 
command of the project in the hands of the regular British officer John Moody, 
who was — surely not by coincidence — Campbell's recommended choice and 
also his former commercial agent in Newfoundland.47 These additional initiatives 
re-enforce the general observations already presented. The central administration 
was usually deficient in acquiring reliable and timely information and, in the 
devlopment of imperial strategy, it was strongly influenced by interested individuals 
and groups. 
Merchants have left less extensive archival evidence of their activity than 
projectors. But what does exist demonstrates that mercantile groups were 
actively involved in the attempt to create overseas policies during the war. The 
concerns for trade protection and naval convoys are well known,48 and commercial 
involvement in the projected expeditions for Canada, Spanish America, the 
Bahamas and Newfoundland has already been noted. There existed, however, a 
basic disjunction between the priorities of projectors and those of most commercial 
interests. In developing strategies, the projector needed to promote a new or 
underdeveloped area of endeavour in order to meet his own desire for personal 
advancement. Military projectors were by nature supporters and creators of 
46 Journal of Trade and Plantations, 1704-1709, pp. 371-4, 387-9, 390-1, 394-6, 399, 400, 414-15, 
478-9, 504, 529, 583-5; Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Planations from February 
1708-9 to March 1714-15 (London, 1925), pp. 48, 95; C.S.P., XXIV, nos. 448, 606; B.L., Add. 
Mss. 61599, fos. 1-7, 61623, fos. 6, 14-17. 
47 B.L., Add. Ms. 61623, fos. 4-5v, 61647, fos. 36-59,60-88v, 121-4v; C.S.P., XXV, no. 85. It should 
be noted that while Moody was a regular army officer and former commander at St. John's, his 
own scheme as it developed in 1709-10 was to re-establish British authority in Newfoundland 
virtually as a government contractor in return for the set sum of £5000. Moody's initiative 
warrants further study. 
48 Crowhurst, British Trade. For the general context of interest group accommodation within the 
central administration see Alison G. Olson, "The Board of Trade and London-American 
Interest Groups in the Eighteenth Century", Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 
VIII (1980), pp. 33-50. 
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ambitious and aggressive policies usually focused upon conquest.The prevalent 
emphasis within all established sectors of trans-Atlantic British trade appears to 
have been to minimize the disruption and losses of the war. Hence, commercial 
interests emphasized trade protection rather than imperial expansion.49 Although 
some merchants could favour aggressive or expansionist policies, as for example 
in the support of a 1708 Spanish American expedition, the urgency of defensive 
appeals stands out. Most trans-Atlantic trade and fishing was under threat and 
in many instances the war created a protracted slump from pre-war levels of 
prosperity. 
The Grand Banks fishery was a case in point. Between 1698 and 1701 the 
lowest level the annual quantity of the catch had reached was approximately 
216,000 quintals; between 1702 and 1706 the highest was 106,000 quintals and in 
one year the catch fell as low as 75,000. In 1699 234 English ships had participated in 
the fishery; in 1706 the number stood at 46. Raids on settlements on the island, 
losses at sea, and the uncertain state of affairs had created a substantial decline in 
the industry, with consequent economic disruption in west country seaports and 
political dissatisfaction, even before the French destruction of St. John's in late 
1708.50 In spite of losses, that event was viewed as virtually a godsend by interested 
parties in Britain since it almost necessitated a governmental response. The 
proposals for the defence of Newfoundland and the fishery descended upon the 
ministry. A decisive one came from James Campbell, a London merchant and 
former resident of St. John's who estimated his personal losses in the Newfoundland 
fishery since the outbreak of war at between £9,000 and £10,000.51 Significantly, 
those overseas initiatives supported by existing mercantile groups tended to lie 
in areas where commercial activity had been most disrupted: the Bahamas lay 
astride principal American trade routes; Port Royal was repeatedly described as 
the "very dunkerk of thiss Country" because it served as a base for privateers; 
and the Newfoundland fishery was in crisis.52 It was in these fields that projectors 
and commercial interests were most likely to find profitable common ground. 
49 Crowhurst, British Trade, pp. 111-7, 139-40, 145-8, 174-82; Haffenden, New England, pp. 
226-30; Steele, Colonial Policy, pp. 100-6; Gary B. Nash, Quakers and Politics: Pennsylvania, 
1681-1726 (Princeton, 1968), pp. 247, 252-4, 258-9; Jones, War and Economy, pp. 47-8, 54-5, 
219,221. Note also Bernard Bailyn and L. Bailyn, Massachusetts Shipping 1697-1714 (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1959), p. 43. 
50 Crowhurst, British Trade, pp. 112-3; Steele, English Atlantic, p. 302, Table 5.1; Head, New-
foundland, pp. 63, 85-6; Glanville J. Davis, "Military Leadership at Newfoundland Before 
1729", Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research, LIX ( 1981 ), p. 199; Journal of Trade 
and Plantations, 1704-1709, pp. 312-17, 449, 461, 468-9, 471, 476, 487, 496; R.G. Lounsbury, 
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XXV, no. 113. 
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Influential mercantile groups were generally more favourably inclined towards 
negotiated settlements of international disputes than they were supportive of the 
projectors' preference for armed conquest. The interests of commerce could be 
advanced as well, if not better, through peace negotiations which eliminated the 
necessity for active participation in an overseas expedition. For example, it is 
significant that the only known communications of the Hudson's Bay Company 
with Secretary of State Sunderland over four years of war occurred when peace 
talks were proceeding or being contemplated. In April 1709 the governor, Sir 
Stephan Evance, sent a long memorial which rehearsed the company's complaints 
against the French dating back to 1682, setting a figure of £108,514.19.8 in 
damages suffered, and sought reassurance that the Company would not be 
ignored in the peace talks then underway. Eleven months later the Company 
wrote an almost identical letter to Sunderland, desiring not to be forgotten in the 
peace process.53 The Treaty of Utrecht established the Company's basic territorial 
claim, without any serious British military initiative ever being contemplated 
during the war. Similarly, when the merchant Soloman Merrett petitioned the 
government concerning the substantial losses of those engaged in the Grand 
Banks fishery, he did not request a military solution. Rather he desired favourable 
inclusion of the affected merchants in the negotiations for the commercial 
Treaty of Barcelona (1707) with the Austrian claimant to the Spanish empire so 
that a free trade in fish from Newfoundland to the Spanish colonies could be 
established.54 When the merchants and inhabitants of Bideford, Devonshire, 
active in the fishery petitioned on 1 June 1710 they requested that whenever 
peace might come the treaty should exclude the French from both Newfoundland 
and the Grand Banks. Likewise, individual minor merchants could attempt 
private negotiation and compromise rather than push for an aggressive military 
policy. When the wine merchant Hugh Colley of Chester had his 50-ton vessel 
the Eagle Galley seized by the French in the North Atlantic and taken to St. 
Malo by way of Newfoundland, he turned to a commercial contact at Bordeaux 
in an effort to purchase the ship from its new owners. Newspaper accounts 
suggest that this could well have been typical behaviour.55 Merchants were 
evidently less assertive as a rule than were the projectors and their views carried 
much greater political significance than those of individual adventurers. 
The other main interested party was the leadership within the colonial administra-
tions. Here as well the common response to war was defensive, favouring the 
status quo rather than the ambitions of the projectors. The colonies lacked unity 
53 B.L., Add. Ms. 61647, fos. 131, 189. For Company lobbying and the peace, E.E. Rich, The 
History of the Hudson's Bay Company, 1670-1870 (2 vols., London, 1958), I, pp. 416-25. 
54 Merrett to Secretary of State Hedges, 5 July 1706, C.S.P., XXIII, no 419. For the stillborn 
Treaty of Barcelona: Walker, Spanish Politics, pp. 72-3. 
55 B.L., Add. Mss. 61599, fo. 159, 61546, fo. 136; The Post-Man, nos. 1287, 1303, 1565. 
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and their approaches to the war favoured sectional concerns. Those leaders who 
vigorously supported aggressive imperial policies, such as Governor Dudley of 
Massachusetts Bay, were exceptional.56 The voluminous correspondence dis-
patched to the commissioners for Trade and Plantations and the secretaries of 
state during the War of Spanish Succession shows an overwhelming preoccupa-
tion with the problems of defence. This is understandable given the limitations 
of strength within each colony, relative isolation, uncertainty concerning enemy 
intentions, and the formal responsibility to defend British territory. Bold initiatives 
and advice of course stand out from the mass of defence-orientated communica-
tions and have attracted the attention of historians, but for their own reasons, 
merchants, governors and colonial agents exaggerated dangers and weaknesses 
in this period.57 The central administration frequently lacked the information or 
perspective to assess the situation independently. Indeed, since internal faction-
alism existed in virtually every colony and the British government was used as a 
political court of appeal and an arena for extended conflict, the ministry was 
frequently inundated with memorials suggestive of wholesale governmental 
collapse across the Atlantic.58 
Colonial governments also demonstrated preference for negotiated gains 
through treaties which required no expenditure or military effort. In late 1709 
the governments of New York, Massachusetts Bay, New Hampshire, Connecticut 
and Rhode Island requested "that if there are overtures of Peace, the 16 Article 
of the [1709] Preliminaries may be enlarged, so as to include all Canada, as well 
as Newfoundland, where by the French will be deprived of there great Nursery of 
seamen and her Majties subjects whollie masters of the fish and furr trade". In 
September 1709 Jeremiah Dummer, soon afterwards appointed provincial agent 
for Massachusetts Bay in London, advanced a more developed argument along 
the same lines.59 Even Samuel Vetch in 1705 was ambivalent whether to fulfill his 
ambitions through military activity or a suitable peace treaty; Governor Dudley 
56 For example, Haffenden, New England, p. 232 and passim; Rawlyk, Nova Scotia's Massachu-
setts; Morgan, "Imperial Co-operation"; G.M. Waller, "New York's Role in Queen Anne's War, 
1702-1713", New York History, XXXIII (1952), pp. 40-53; Vincent Harlow, Christopher Codrington, 
1668-1710 (Oxford, 1928); Thomas E. Norton, The Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 1686-1776 
(Madison, 1974), pp. 128-33. 
57 For example, Crowhurst, British Trade, p. 179. 
58 As a single illustration, the political dispute in Barbados produced in little more than three years 
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included both possibilities in his 1710 communications.60 One of the most ambitious 
imperial proposals of the period, authored by William Penn of Pennsylvania, 
relied upon territorial and commercial expansion through treaty. During the 
peace negotiations of 1709 in Holland, Penn petitioned the Duke of Marlborough 
for a dual approach to the settlement of North American and Carribean issues. 
British North America would be expanded by restricting the French through 
treaty to the area north of the St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes. The 
British would possess all the Mississippi valley and the continent to the west: "I 
humbly refer it all to the Dukes English heart and head, to secure to his Country 
so great an one and ofthat vallue on many accounts (and no more, I think, than 
we have a real claime to)". Within the Caribbean region Penn called for a series 
of measures to protect British trade, provide freedom of the seas for peaceful 
nations, facilitate the suppression of piracy, and establish a right of British ships 
to refit in Spanish and French territories.61 Penn's proposals fitted the specific 
needs of his colony with its rapidly developing frontier and an expanding trade 
with the Caribbean. But his ideas were wholly out of tune with imperial policies 
at this date.62 
The material at the disposal of the central government for developing imperial 
policies was limited, frequently of questionable reliability, and most always 
biased towards a personal or sectional interest. The representations from the 
commercial and colonial groups which carried the greatest weight favoured 
defence, protection of existing interests and at most expansion through treaty 
rather than by means of military and naval initiatives. Some exceptions do stand 
out, but there is no reason to believe the government was favourably predisposed 
towards them. Clearly the projectors faced both a largely indifferent ministry 
and vested interests whose goals ran only partially parallel to their own. They 
had to create feasible projects and attract interest within restricted parameters, 
and it is little wonder that their success rate was so low. A government whose 
main objectives lay in Europe and which held few colonial objectives possessed 
little incentive to establish or even contemplate an ambitious imperial policy. 
Most certainly the British ministry did not intend to conclude the war under 
60 B.L., Egerton Ms. 929, fo. 94, Add. Ms. 61599, fo. 151; C.S.P., XXV, no. 81. 
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conditions harmful to overseas commerce, particularly with Spanish America. 
But did the Crown in its own right possess any notable colonial objectives? One 
possible objective was related to resources. Although the Newfoundland fishery 
was frequently promoted as a nursery of seamen, the government does not 
appear to have ever believed the war would drive the British permanently from 
the Grand Banks and the manpower implications for the British navy occur at 
best only sporadically in the documentation. More evident was the potential for 
the northern colonies to develop into a major provider of naval supplies. This 
argument featured prominently in the proposals of promoters such as Vetch and 
Simon Clement, as well as representations from Massachusetts Bay. The central 
administration was reasonably responsive to naval stores as a colonial objective, 
and proposals frequently met with an interested reception from the commissioners 
for Trade and Plantations and sometimes as well from the commissioners of the 
Navy.63 However, the concern was never sufficiently substantial to be decisive. In 
December 1706 the commissioners of the Navy could appreciate the national 
advantage of exploiting American supply potential, but because their instructions 
were to purchase stores as cheaply as possible they considered the Baltic to be 
Britain's primary supplier.64 It was only during the later stages of the war, as the 
consequence of the more immediate problem of numerous unsettled German 
refugees from the Palatinate arrived in England, that a number of the Palatines 
were sent to New York where they could be employed in the production of naval 
products.65 
The primary Crown objective was simply to maintain the authority and 
territories of the British monarchy. It has been argued that the geopolitics of all 
the 18th century Atlantic colonial empires — with the notable exception of the 
British — were essentially defensive.66 The British exception, however, came in 
the later 18th century and British colonial policies during the War of Spanish 
Succession were both restricted and almost entirely defensive. Previous studies 
have tended to interpret this limitation overwhelmingly in terms of a Euro-
centric preoccupation at Whitehall. Although British politicians certainly believed 
the main objectives of the war lay in Europe, the colonies could not be ignored. 
Alongside military, strategic and economic reasoning there still existed the notion of 
Britain's territories as an inalienable royal patrimony. Inheritance and royal 
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nos. 81, 172,511,637,641, 1186 and passim. 
64 Journal of Trade and Plantations, 1704-1709, pp. 303-4; CS.P., XXIII, 673. 
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prestige were interwoven and this was a far from negligible consideration for the 
Queen's government. All the Atlantic territorial acquisitions of the Treaty of 
Utrecht revolved around the recognition of Britain's claims to disputed land: St. 
Kitts, Newfoundland, Hudson's Bay and Nova Scotia. Viewed as imperial 
aggrandizement these territories were fragmented and limited in value. Viewed 
in relation to the existing empire the gains failed to resolve contentious issues or 
prevent future imperial strife. Viewed as the settlement and defence of an existing 
"historical" patrimony the acquisitions were reasonable objectives. As a Hudson's 
Bay Company official stated in 1709, "The Crown of England has an undoubted 
right to the whole Bay and Streights of Hudson, and therefore Her Majesty can 
never relinquish that claim".67 In 1709, after Queen Anne received a memorial 
from the council and assembly of Massachusetts Bay relating to the need for the 
subjection of Port Royal, she specifically demanded to know at what date Nova 
Scotia had been taken from the English by the French.68 The timing of the 
transfer obviously bore no relation to military or economic considerations. It 
could, however, reflect directly upon the honour of her family. During the war 
the Board of Trade and Plantations devoted considerable attention to documen-
ting for the ministry the historical British claim to all Newfoundland. Proponents of 
colonial expansion frequently included related concepts in their arguments; 
Penn, for example, emphasized his proposal was "no more, I think, than we have 
a real claime to". In September 1709 Jeremiah Dummer began his memorial for 
the acquisition of Canada with the argument that the French colony on the St. 
Lawrence originally had, and of right still, belonged to Great Britain.69 This can 
be rejected as a historical inaccuracy. But what should not be ignored is the 
climate of opinion at Whitehall which implicitly encouraged Dummer and 
others to present their ambitious policies in the guise of restoration and tradition. 
Clearly the ministerial mentality within Britain was not in tune with aggressive 
imperialism. 
Imperial policy was very largely the fixation of individual projectors and some 
vested interest groups. The ministry devoted relatively little attention to the 
colonies and lacked reliable intelligence or information relevant to imperial 
planning. The pressure to develop a superior intelligence system or to formulate 
aggressive expansionist goals was largely absent. Even when political and military 
events favoured a more assertive overseas policy during the later stages of the 
war, the British administration had to rely almost entirely upon the self-interested 
schemes of individuals. There were many of these to choose between, and the 
astute parties recognized the need to align their projects, or at least their rhetoric, 
67 Rich, Hudson's Bay Company, I, p. 418 (emphasis mine). 
68 Sunderland to commissioners of Trade and Plantations, 24 May 1709, B.L., Add. Ms. 61652, fo. 
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with the concerns of the state. The result was an overseas policy which shifted 
with, the tides of external events,* informed petitioning and influential prompting. 
Although the ultimate authority for British policy formation lay with the Queen 
and cabinet, they depended upon advice from several overlapping jurisdictions. 
Apart from the defence of the status quo, Whitehall lacked significant imperial 
goals of its own during the war. Those it supported — and frequently abandoned 
— were the initiatives of the projectors. 
